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Abstract
This paper develops a quantitative model that can rationally explain a
substantial part of the dramatic rise and fall of house prices in the 2000-
2009 period. The model is driven by the assumption that the government
cannot resist bailing out large financial institutions, but can mitigate the con-
sequences of that through regulation of risk. An episode of relaxed regulation
is welfare-reducing, results in opportunistic behavior by lenders, and for plau-
sible parameters inflates house prices and price/rent ratios by nearly twenty
percent. This “boom” is followed by a collapse in house prices accompanied
by high default rates.
The housing boom and bust cycle of the 2000s continues to attract a wide range
of explanations. As is well known, real house prices rose some 30 to 40 percent
relative to trend between 1998 and 2007. By 2010, in the wake of the financial
crisis and recession, house prices had fallen back nearly to 1998 levels. The ratio
of nominal house prices to rents experienced a similar increase and crash. (See
Figures 1 and 2.) While some portion of the rise may be attributable to macroeco-
nomic factors such as income growth and low interest rates, the magnitude of the
boom appears to have gone far beyond what standard fundamentals can explain.
For example, in the two prior business cycle expansions, the average real increase
in house prices and price-rent ratios was only on the order of ten percent, which
suggests an “excess” real appreciation of approximately 25 percent.
Much of the research on the so-called “housing bubble” has focused either on
unconventional beliefs or on exogenously imposed shocks to credit availability.
As examples, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2011), and Boz and Mendoza (2014) incorporate heterogeneous beliefs or other
departures from rational expectations, motivated by the notion (one we seek to
refute) that it is otherwise not possible to explain the boom and bust. Other
authors, e.g. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010), obtain price
effects by alternately imposing or relaxing exogenous changes in credit limits for
which there is no clear rationale to begin with. If a borrowing limit is just exoge-
nously imposed (as opposed to being motivated by some other market failure),
eliminating it tends to make agents better off by increasing their options. Absent
any reason for credit restrictions, naturally they have adverse consequences for
asset prices and welfare, and they can have the awkward implication that high
price-low friction regime is preferred (see, for example, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2011) and Kocherlakota (2009)), which is not how most observers see the boom
leading up to the 2008 crisis. Papers that focus on the adverse consequences of re-
laxed credit, e.g. Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), Corbae and Quintin (2015),
tend to limit their analysis to credit outcomes and treat house prices as exoge-
nous. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) and Arslan, Guler, and Taskin (2015)
have endogenous house prices, but only model the decline in prices resulting from
exogenous increases in financial frictions and other macroeconomic factors.
By contrast, we offer a model in which binding credit constraints are a welfare-
improving response to the government’s presumed inability to allow large financial
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institutions to fail. In our baseline case, the combination of the credit limit and the
pre-commitment problem results in a benign outcome, with house prices close to
fundamentals and low default rates on mortgages. A relaxation of the credit stan-
dards (modeled as the eligibility requirements for mortgage to be repurchased
and guaranteed by a government-sponsored enterprise such as Fannie Mae) then
results in a distortion of house prices of approximately 18 percent above funda-
mentals, or some three-fourths of the 25 percent excess appreciation in the market
suggested in figure 1.
While our paper has in common with the above-mentioned papers the exogene-
ity of the policy change (in our case, a relaxation of credit standards), we argue
that relaxation or regulation is common, and readily explained by complacency
or regulatory capture. The motivation for a welfare-reducing imposition of credit
constraints in the literature is less clear. In addition, our model maintains stan-
dard assumptions that beliefs are rational and homogeneous. In our setting, house
prices are bid up as a consequence of increased leverage coupled with a system of
guarantees or implicit promises of bailouts.1 That system, the intent of which is to
support home ownership by subsidizing borrowers, gives rise to an ever-present
incentive toward excessive leverage, as borrowers and lenders do not face the full
consequences of higher default risk. Normally that incentive is blunted by strict
limits on leverage as well as scrutiny of borrowers to weed out bad risks, and the
result is a system that indeed supports expansive borrowing with little impact on
either defaults or house prices.
With that benign outcome as a baseline, we then examine the impact of re-
laxing the limits on borrowing. Again, why this regulatory relaxation occurred
is something we do not model explicitly, though we review some of the possible
explanations in the next section. There is substantial evidence that it did occur,
however. There are documented increases in loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, as well
as the apparently increased disregard for other risk-related characteristics of bor-
rowers (see Demyanyk and Hemert (2011), for example). In fact, a large number
of mortgages in the period leading up to the crisis had combined LTVs (including
second mortgages, home equity loans, etc.) of 100 percent.
While aspects of this story are certainly not new, this is the first effort we are
1Neuberg et al. (2016) find evidence in credit default swap pricing that in Europe, at least,
perceived bailout probabilities have declined since 2014.
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aware of to quantify in a general equilibrium model the impact of this regulatory
lapse on house prices, during both the boom and the bust, and to depict the harm
of the boom as leading inexorably to the debacle of a crisis. The model also
realistically captures the impact on leverage and subsequent default rates. To
accomplish all this we have to make certain restrictions for tractability (though we
believe the model could be extended to relax these assumptions without significant
impact to the main results):
• We assume a fixed stock of housing, i.e. we rule out construction
• We have a perfect foresight model with only idiosyncratic risk.
• We assume one-period debt contracts with a simple default rule.
Even so we are able to make the government’s intervention contingent realistically
on aggregate losses in the financial industry.2
Of course the United States is not the only country to have experienced a sig-
nificant boom-bust cycle in housing market. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to lay out the details of the events in other countries, we would note that
many other economies experienced a relaxation of lending standards in conjunc-
tion with the boom in their house prices. More important, and consistent with our
story, many of these episodes were followed by crashes and bailouts of financial
institutions in distress. For example, the Swedish government bailed out numer-
ous banks in 1992 following a deregulation-fueled housing boom and bust. (See
Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995).) Spain and Ireland experienced similar episodes
in which home prices were significantly inflated above the trend during the decade
or so prior to 2007. In both cases financial sector supervision was lax and permit-
ted arguably reckless lending practices (Akin et al. (2014)). In addition, bailouts
of financial institutions occurred in the aftermath of the crash. (See Waldron and
Redmond (2014), Beck et al. (2010).)
In any case, we do not claim to explain the entire boom and bust in U.S. hous-
ing. Rather, we isolate one set of factors which we argue played an important role,
2In this regard the paper differs from Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), who only compare
across steady states, and who fix the price of housing (by having a linear transformation between
housing and non-housing consumption) and consequently focus on default risk. We endogenize
house prices by fixing the stock but, like Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), impose discipline by
having realistic default rates and default costs in our baseline.
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accounting for the majority of the excess movement in house prices, along with
the explosion of defaults.
1 Background: Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Mort-
gage Lending
A complete history of government involvement in mortgage lending is beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that since the Great Depression, the gov-
ernment has had a major role in making mortgages more widely available and
affordable to borrowers, and more liquid for lenders. The primary mechanisms
have been the purchasing, insuring, and securitizing of mortgages. These efforts
were successful in greatly expanding mortgage loans and, arguably, home owner-
ship. For most of this period, through the mid-1980s, government agencies such
as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae, confined their involvement to loans that met
relatively strict and objective standards for quality. The FHA, which insured pri-
vate mortgages, was in principle self-financing, i.e. the insurance premiums were
set to price default risk accurately.
Beginning with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, policy began to focus on ex-
panding the availability of credit to those who had previously found it difficult to
obtain, first by outlawing discrimination, but then by encouraging the extension
of credit to riskier pools of borrowers. During this same period, Fannie Mae was
privatized (though it was widely perceived to have implicit government backing),
and was allowed to purchase private non-insured mortgages (as opposed to those
insured by the FHA or other government agencies). By the 1990s, the GSEs were
required to meet “affordable housing” goals, meaning targets for mortgages of
low-income homeowners. These goals became more ambitious by the late 1990s,
with private lenders also getting into the act with “subprime” and other loans that
did not conform to GSE standards. Ultimately these markets grew enormously,
and lenders, both government and private, took on more risk and became highly
vulnerable to an economic downturn.
Nonetheless there is considerable debate over the extent to which the implicit
government backing of the GSEs, as well as the “too big to fail” nature of the
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largest private financial institutions, contributed to this process and ultimately to
the magnitude of the crisis that developed in 2008. For example, Paul Krugman
writes that “Fannie and Freddie didn’t do any subprime lending, because they
can’t: the definition of a subprime loan is precisely a loan that doesn’t meet the
requirement[s]” imposed on the agencies.3
While it is true that default rates on mortgages in GSE portfolios were sub-
stantially lower than overall rates, even within the category of loans labeled as
“prime,” this sanguine view of the GSEs overlooks several important facts.4 First,
as Krugman acknowledges, the GSEs were undercapitalized. Acharya et al. (2011),
for example note that Fannie and Freddie had only a 0.45% capital requirement
on mortgages they insured, and 2.5% for their balance sheet assets (p. 24). This
of course made them more profitable during the boom, but vulnerable to a down-
turn in house prices or to an uptick in defaults, both of which occurred by 2007.
Second, Fannie and Freddie purchased billions of dollars of subprime-backed secu-
rities for their own investment portfolios, in part as a means of meeting affordable
housing toals. Finally, while the GSEs historically had been constrained to limit
their purchases to mortgages with no more than 80 percent LTV, moderate debt-to-
income ratios, and to borrowers with good credit scores, as Acharya et al. (2011)
write (p. 39) that “After the mid-1990s . . . the GSE’s mortgage underwriting
standards deteriorated.” They add that the lower quality of their mortgages “was
masked by the continued rise in housing prices through mid-2006.” Figures 3 and
4 depict the GSE’s increased involvement in high-LTV mortgages and private-label
securitizations that (along with other risks and high leverage) ultimately put their
solvency in jeopardy. Whether this was due to pressure from HUD to reach “ex-
panded affordability” goals, or was driven by the GSE’s own quest for profit, is not
important for our story.
Acharya et al. (2011) pinpoint the origin of the problem to the ironically-
named Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act (FHEF-
SSA), somewhat reluctantly signed into law by President George H.W. Bush in
1992. The intent of the legislation had been to restrain the GSEs, but political
3New York Times, July 14, 2008. See also Pressman, “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were victims,
not culprits” Business Week, September 26, 2008.
4For example, David Fiderer (http://www.fidererongses.com/params/post/695326/martin-
fridson-embraces-the-big-lie-to-challenge-the-big-short) presents data that in early 2009 Fannie
and Freddie’s delinquency rates were below 3%, compared to a 6% overall delinquency rate.
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compromises led to its containing a major Trojan horse: “mission goals” to sup-
port housing and mortgages for “underserved areas.” In addition, the newly cre-
ated regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), was
placed in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rather than
a more politically independent entity such as the Federal Reserve. The presence
of these goals facilitated massive growth of low-quality mortgages, both through
the increased ability of the GSEs to repurchase them as well as the participation of
arguably too-big-to-fail so-called “large complex financial institutions” (LCFIs).5
Thus there is a strong case that the GSEs, armed with what was widely viewed
as government backing, played a role in the expansion of credit that was po-
tentially much larger than their direct role in subprime lending, while at the
same time their high leverage made them vulnerable to insolvency and illiquid-
ity. Large private financial institutions were not quite as highly levered as Fannie
and Freddie, but likely saw themselves as too big to fail (i.e. subject to govern-
ment bailouts) or as being able to sell low quality mortgages to investors up a food
chain that was ultimately backed by the government, either implicitly or explicitly.
There are of course many other aspects to the financial crisis, notably the errors
of rating agencies and private mortgage insurers, and, related, apparent underes-
timation of the risk of aggregate declines in house prices. While we ostensibly
lump all of this together as the consequence of TBTF, we do not intend to rule out
other factors as being important. In particular, there are sources of moral hazard
within financial institutions that might lead to excessive risk-taking, such as the
misalignment of incentives between creditors and shareholders.6 The goal of the
paper is simply to quantify what we believe to be one important contributor to the
boom and bust. In particular, the model does not rely critically on the role of the
GSEs; large private financial institutions, provided they have some expectation of
being bailed out in a crisis, could play the same role.
5The 14 LCFIs were considered to be, according to Acharya et al. (2011), Citigroup, Bank of
America, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, AIG, Goldman Sachs, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, and Wells Fargo. Arguably 11 of the 14 were at risk
of failure at some point in 2008, and all but one of those eleven were either bailed out by the
governnment or folded into one of the three relatively healthy institutions (Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, and JP Morgan). Lehman, of course, was the unique case of an LCFI that was allowed to
fail.
6A challenge to such moral hazard explanations, however, is to explain the timing of the crisis,
since these problems have been around for as long as there have been corporations.
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In the next several sections, we formalize these ideas in a general equilibrium
model of housing and mortgage markets, with a government that attempts to
support the housing market while regulating risk, but that also cannot credibly
commit to let large financial institutions fail.
2 A Dynamic Model with Heterogeneous Agents
Our ultimate goal is to assess the consequences of a policy change, specifically
a change in conforming loan limits. For our purposes, “conforming” refers to a
mortgage that qualifies for purchase or securitization by GSEs, and consequently
for any favorable treatment or subsidy via government policy. We will begin with
a description of stationary competitive equilibrium, and later build a dynamic
analysis on this foundation.
Time t ∈ {0, 1, ...} is discrete. There is a continuum of households of measure
1, and a large number N¯  1 of potential entrants/competitors in the financial
sector. A competitive representative firm produces consumption and capital goods.
The housing stock of the economy is in fixed supply, equal to 1, and there is no
explicit rental market for housing.7 There is a government that taxes household
labor income, and uses the proceeds to finance mortgage guarantees whenever
necessary. In what follows, we suppress individual subscripts, but in general, all
quantities vary across agents.
2.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption ct and housing services ht+1, discount-
ing the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). The preferences over consumption goods and
housing services are represented by the utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht+1). (1)
Housing services at time t are produced by a linear technology that uses the stock
of housing the household owns. With some abuse of notation, we use ht+1 to
7We will, however, consider the behavior of implied rents, so that the model can address the
behavior of the ratio of house prices to rents.
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denote both. The price of consumption is normalized to 1, and the price of housing
at date t is Pt. It will be clear that income does not affect default decisions in
our framework; therefore we simplify the analysis by assuming identical labor
income across households. In particular, households supply labor inelastically at a
common post-tax wage rate w¯t = (1 − τt)wt. Nothing of any importance changes
if we add idiosyncratic income risk.
Households may only borrow using housing as collateral, as unsecured borrow-
ing is assumed to be unenforceable. We use bt+1 to denote the stock of mortgage
debt acquired at time t, and at+1 to denote the holdings of risk-free assets acquired
at time t. Given the “no unsecured borrowing” assumption, we have bt+1 ≥ 0 and
at+1 ≥ 0 for all time periods. Specifically, households borrow through financial in-
termediaries, modeled as a sequence of one-period mortgage contracts similar to
the treatment in Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013). However, under our assump-
tions below, mortgages will in fact look like adjustable-rate mortgages of stochastic
duration. Asset markets are incomplete, given the lack of insurance with respect
to the idiosyncratic risks. We will use rt to denote the risk-free rate on at+1 and
ρt to denote the mortgage interest rate that depends on the characteristics of the
loan as well as other relevant macroeconomic variables. We assume that interest
payments on the mortgage contracts are enforceable, but repayment of principal
is only backed by the risky housing collateral of the individual borrower.8
We assume that there is no aggregate risk, and two sources of idiosyncratic
uncertainty. One shock is an idiosyncratic i.i.d. “quality” shock xt ≥ 0 to hous-
ing. These quality shocks occur prior to the households’ decisions about consump-
tion, housing, and borrowing, and are distributed across households according to
cumulative distribution function G(x) and density g(x) with support [x, x¯], and
E(x) = 1. They can be thought of as neighborhood effects that result in unpre-
dictable cross-sectional variation in house prices.
The second source of idiosyncratic uncertainty relates to inertial frictions. We
observe that households do not freely vary their choice of housing or their fi-
nancing at every opportunity. Presumably this is because of some combination of
transactions costs and inattention. In lieu of modeling the micro-foundations of
this inertia in detail, we impose “Calvo-style” adjustment costs: Poisson probabili-
8This assumption is only aesthetic, so that an LTV of one is a natural limit.
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ties of being allowed to move or to refinance. These have the effect of realistically
slowing the response of households to changes in their environment. Specifically,
we assume that, with probability m ∈ [0, 1], a household becomes a mover (type
m). A mover is free to choose the housing stock ht+1, and can borrow bt+1 against
the value of the new dwelling, subject to the relevant debt constraints which we
will clarify shortly. With probability (1−m)f , where f ∈ [0, 1], the household be-
comes a refinancer (type f). This household cannot move, but is free to adjust its
debt level, subject to borrowing constraints. If a household is neither a mover nor
a refinancer, then it becomes type n, which occurs with probability (1−m)(1− f).
These households are stuck with their previous choice of h and b, but must pay
a fraction of at least θ ∈ [0, 1] of the existing debt. That is, if a type n household
enters period t with (ht, bt), it must choose ht+1 = ht and bt+1 ≤ (1− θ)bt.
While this approach to modeling moving and refinancing lacks micro founda-
tions, we adopt it for tractability, and note that these frictions play very little role,
if any, in our quantitative results on the magnitude of home price inflation. We
will see that with or without these frictions, the magnitude of the price response to
changes in lending standards in our model is virtually identical. The frictions are
crucial only to the extent that they result in more realistic dynamics for both prices
and quantities. They do so by preventing sudden “jumps” in variables of interest
(such as high-LTV mortgages) as a response to news or to policy changes, similar
to the motivation for search frictions. We should also note that there was consid-
erable geographic variation in the incidence of subprime lending, which suggests
that the availability of such loans was in part due to factors beyond individual
borrowers’ control. This provides additional justification for our modeling.
In what follows we distinguish between default and foreclosure. Default is a
simple failure to repay the principal of the loan. It does not by itself trigger any
dead-weight losses (such as legal costs) or “moving” (in the sense of the m shock
described above). Foreclosure is a costly legal process that involves the owner
moving in that same sense. We discuss foreclosure costs in more detail, and the
implications of foreclosure versus default from the perspective of the lender, below
in our discussion of financial markets (Section 2.4).
Any household can choose to default. To simplify the analysis—in particular
to make the default decision simple and non-strategic in a sense to be described
below, we make two assumptions about the consequences of default.
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Assumption 1 Households cannot move unless they receive the moving shock, even
if they default.
A direct consequence of this assumption together with non-enforceability of
the repayment of principal, is that a non-mover borrower (type f or n) who de-
faults has his debt level written down to 100% of the value of the house. This
arrangement serves two purposes: The first is empirically motivated, as a frac-
tion of defaults end up in foreclosures in the U.S. Rather, the majority result in
banks accepting a loss on the difference between the sale price of the house and
the remaining principal on the mortgage; our assumption mimics this outcome.
Second, it eliminates the incentive for a “strategic” default decision where, absent
any default costs for the borrowers, an agent might choose to default just for the
opportunity to move or refinance that comes with it.
Note that even with the above assumption in place, a type n household might
choose to default strategically to avoid having to make the required payment θbt.
This motivates the second assumption:
Assumption 2 Type n households are required to pay at least a share θ ∈ [0, 1] of
their debt even if they default.
Under these two assumptions, households default on their mortgages if and
only if they have negative equity. We make these assumptions purely for tractabil-
ity. The fact that owners frequently repay their loans even when they are “under
water,” and indeed many optimal default models suggest they should (see, for ex-
ample, Krainer and LeRoy (2010) and references therein) does not undermine our
findings, because—as will become clear—the crucial variables are the probability
of default and losses conditional on default. As long as our model has realistic
predictions for those quantities, our quantitative results are robust to the behav-
ioral assumptions about default. If anything, our approach underestimates the
impact: Were we to assume, for example, that homeowners only defaulted when
substantially under water, and recalibrated the distribution of x to get the same
probability of default, losses conditional on default would be greater, and conse-
quently our model would predict even larger house price distortions than we find
in our calibration.
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As to foreclosure, since it almost invariably involves relocation of the former
owner, for simplicity we assume that foreclosure occurs when a defaulter receives
the m shock. With foreclosure, a defaulter cedes the house to the bank in lieu of
repayment of the principal. So to summarize: A default occurs if and only if the
value of the house falls below the value of the principal on the debt. A foreclosure
occurs if a defaulter receives the m shock. This is clearly a simplification: For
example, many defaults result in a voluntary or negotiated sale of the property and
relocation by the former owner. Our assumptions are for the sake of parsimony
and simplicity and have little impact on the main results of the paper.
The timing within a period t is as follows:
1. Households make interest payments on their existing mortgage.
2. Households observe x and their type {m, f, n}, and make default decisions.
3. Given prices, households choose ct, at+1, bt+1, ht+1 subject to the budget
constraint and restrictions imposed by their types. Housing ht+1 can be used
immediately for housing services at time t.
As mentioned above, our assumptions imply that the household will choose to
default at time t+ 1 if and only if
xt+1Pt+1ht+1 − bt+1 < 0 (2)
This defines a threshold value of shock, zt+1 ≡ bt+1Pt+1ht+1 . If the household draws
a value xt+1 < zt+1 next period, which happens with probability G(zt+1), default
occurs.
Assuming for now that the economy is at a steady state, we drop the time
subscripts from all prices, assuming Pt = P , rt = r, w¯t = w¯, and ρt(.) = ρ(.)
for all t. In equilibrium, due to competition among the financial intermediaries,
and the fact that loan-to-value (LTV) ratio zt+1 alone captures the default risk of a
borrower, the intermediaries will offer mortgages with interest rates that take the
form ρ(zt+1). This will be clarified further in the next few sections when we discuss
the nature of competition in the financial sector. Due to the simple structure of
mortgage loans, we prefer to formulate the budget constraint of a household using
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the LTV ratio zt+1 rather than bt+1 by using the transformation bt+1 = Pht+1zt+1.
ct+Pht+1(1−zt+1)+at+1 ≤ w¯+at(1+r)+Pht
(
max{0, xt−zt}−ρ(zt)zt
) ≡ It (3)
ct, ht+1, at+1 ≥ 0, and zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]
ht+1 = htxt for types {f, n}
zt+1 ≤ (1− θ) min{1, zt
xt
} for type n
A household enters period t with after-tax wage w¯, assets at and housing ht
net of the interest payment Phtρ(zt)zt. Having chosen an LTV ratio zt in period
t − 1, upon realization of shock value xt, the household receives a net return (or
capital gain) of Pht max{0, xt − zt} from housing, after taking the optimal default
decision captured by the max operator. Including the wage level and return on
assets, the total resources available to the household, after the default decision, is
represented above by the term It. These resources are spent on consumption ct,
housing ht+1, and assets at+1. A non-mover household is restricted to “choose” the
current housing stock htxt. Moreover, the household can get a loan of Pht+1zt+1
against the value of current housing Pht+1 by writing a new mortgage contract.
The type of contracts available depends on the household type. In particular, a
type n household is restricted to choose a debt level that is lower than a share
(1 − θ) of the existing debt after taking the default decision, i.e. after the debt is
written down by the lender.
As mentioned, with the frictions we impose on the model, we can interpret the
time period between two moving or refinancing shocks (i.e. remaining a type n
borrower) as the (stochastic) duration of a multi-period mortgage contract. Over
the lifetime of a mortgage contract, the borrower needs to pay at least a constant
share of the debt every period and is subject to an “adjustable rate” based on a
re-evaluation of default probability by the lender.
Although mortgages with LTVs in excess of 100 percent were not unheard of
during the housing boom, these were primarily to cover both the price of the
house and closing costs. For now, our setting with no closing costs simply requires
zt+1 ≤ 1. (Otherwise, the household would default upon receipt of the loan and
pocket the difference between the loan and the value of the house.) Below we will
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motivate government intervention in the form of an LTV limit ζ < 1 on conforming
loans.
We now omit time subscripts on choice variables, and use ′ to indicate those
choice variables formerly dated t + 1. The household’s decision problem at the
point of choosing c, h′, z′, a′—that is, after the idiosyncratic shocks have been re-
alized and any default decision has occurred—can be written recursively using its
type i ∈ {m, f, n}, total resources I, housing h, LTV for the existing debt z (after
any write-down by the lender if the household defaulted) as state variables. For
what is to follow let, pim ≡ m, pif ≡ (1−m)f , pin ≡ (1−m)(1− f) represent type
probabilities:
Vi(I, h, z) = max{c,a′,z′,h′}
u(c, h′) + β
∑
j∈{m,f,n}
pijEVj(I ′, h′x′,min{1, z
′
x′
}) (4)
subject to
c+ Ph′(1− z′) + a′ ≤ I
c, a′, h′ ≥ 0, and z′ ∈ [0, 1]
I ′ ≡ I ′(a′, h′, z′) = w¯ + a′(1 + r) + Ph′(max{0, x′ − z′} − ρ(z′)z′)
h′ = h for types i ∈ {f, n}
z′ ≤ (1− θ)z for type i = n
2.2 Production
There is a representative firm that uses capitalK and labor L, producing consump-
tion and capital goods using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The output of
the representative firm is
Y = AKαL1−α
For convenience, we also define F (K,L) ≡ AKαL1−α − δK, the output net of
depreciation. The firm rents capital at rate r and labor at rate w in competitive
factor markets.
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2.3 Government
We now introduce key features of the government’s role in the mortgage market:
First, we posit that the government cannot credibly commit to let large financial
institutions fail, or in the context of this model, incur huge losses-the “Too Big to
Fail” (TBTF) phenomenon. Below we will define “large” in terms of market share
s ∈ [0, 1]. Second, as a consequence, financial regulators take measures to limit
large institutions’ risk-taking, which because of TBTF would tend to be excessive.9
Indeed the key risk-reduction measures that we focus on, which in the model are
distilled down to LTV limits, are those that historically applied particularly to large
protected institutions such as Fannie Mae. The GSEs were long restricted to pur-
chasing only “conforming” mortgages that were limited in size and LTV ratio.10
Other institutions had more flexibility, though for the most part they historically
could not sell non-conforming mortgages to the GSEs. Under our baseline as-
sumptions, the equilibrium involves low default risk and house prices very close
to what their values would be in the absence of TBTF. When the regulations are
relaxed or circumvented, the equilibrium changes to one in which TBTF institu-
tions take over the market. As a consequence, default risk increases, of course,
but our model also implies a large increase in house prices, with no corresponding
change in (implicit) rental prices.
To clarify the notation that follows, for any parameter or variable set by the
government, a bar will indicate its baseline or “normal” value, while a ˆ will in-
dicate its value during the boom. We assume that the initial policy change is
unanticipated, and that once a bailout occurs, it is common knowledge that the
policy will revert to the baseline forever.
We assume that in “normal” times the government, for reasons that we do not
model, wishes to support the housing market, and does so by modestly subsidiz-
ing mortgage lending.11 In our simplified setup, in which credit risk derives only
from the idiosyncratic x shock, the distribution of which is assumed to be identical
9This is not to suggest that small banks are not also regulated in their risk-taking, but that is
largely because of deposit insurance as opposed to discretionary bailouts.
10There have been other requirements as well: Debt to income ratio, credit score, income docu-
mentation, etc., though these appear to have varied over time.
11In a world with a choice between home ownership and renting, there may be positive exter-
nalities to ownership that the government wishes to subsidize. The government may also see itself
as helpful in creating markets, as it has for securitized mortgages.
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across all agents and houses, LTV is a sufficient statistic for default risk. Hence,
to mitigate the potential moral hazard of excessive risk-taking, it suffices for gov-
ernment to control LTVs. We assume this takes the form of a simple LTV limit
ζ = ζ¯ ∈ (0, 1], so that z ≤ ζ is required for a mortgage to be conforming. Below
we will show that this policy is in fact effective. The subsidy takes the form of a
government guarantee to the lender of a share η¯ ∈ [0, 1] of any unpaid principal
on a conforming mortgage.12
The fact that the model contains no reasons for the government’s temptation to
bail out large financial institutions, or for the subsidies to home ownership, does
not mean no such reasons exist. There may be substantial “collateral damage”
from failures of such institutions, and there may be, for example, positive exter-
nalities from home ownership that are missing from the model.13 Our point is not
that these policies are intrinsically bad—indeed in our baseline they are relatively
benign. Rather it is to point out the fragility of the benign outcome, and to il-
lustrate how modifications to the policies could have a dramatic impact. It is our
contention that enriching the model to motivate the policies would not alter the
main results.
The TBTF aspect of policy works as follows: Let λ denote the aggregate losses
incurred by banks on conforming mortgages as a share of GDP, when the govern-
ment offers the baseline subsidy η¯ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition to the baseline subsidy, a
government “bailout” (meaning some ηˆ  η¯ on conforming loans) is triggered for
one period, for any financial institution with s > s∗, in the event that aggregate
losses as a share of GDP exceeds some threshold λ∗.14 We call such an event a
“crisis.” After a bailout, it is understood that η reverts to η¯ forever.
We shall see below that as long as the LTV limit on conforming loans ζ is such
that aggregate default risk is low, and provided the modest baseline η¯ is sufficiently
high to encourage borrowing despite foreclosure costs, then mortgage lending
will occur, but the (small) subsidy will have a negligible impact on the market.
12This can be shown to be equivalent in our model to subsidizing the interest rate on conforming
mortgages, or to underpricing mortgage insurance. We use the “guarantee” language (meaning ex
post replacement of losses) so that η can also serve as the measure of bailouts.
13Others, e.g. Morgenson and Rosner (2011), suggest more sinister motives involving corruption
and cronyism.
14We assume the government can pre-commit to limit its bailout to conforming loans. This could
be either because the government can prevent institutions from making so many risky loans, or
politically it is feasible to let banks that plunged into non-conforming loans fail.
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There are no aggregate losses, and no crisis or bailout occurs in equilibrium. This
is the case because aggregate losses would be limited quantitatively even in the
(off-equilibrium) contingency that banks engage in reckless lending practices by
ignoring default risk completely.15 On the other hand, should the government
choose a sufficiently high ζ, the resulting equilibrium would culminate in a crisis
and bailout, the dynamics of which depend on the inertial friction parameters m
and f . Movers would then borrow up to the now higher LTV limit, and eventually
the debt levels and default risk build up to the point that a crisis and bailout occur.
In the absence of the frictions this would happen immediately when LTV limits are
relaxed.
To finance the subsidy (or the bailout in the event that occurs), government
taxes labor income linearly at rate τ . Since labor supply is inelastic and the house-
holds are identical in terms of their labor endowment, this is effectively a lump-
sum tax equal to τw. We assume that the government runs a balanced budget
each period.
The baseline government policy is thus defined by LTV limit, subsidy, and
bailout threshold parameters {ζ¯ , η¯, s∗, λ∗, ηˆ}. In our baseline quantitative exer-
cise, it will turn out, realistically, that η¯ (calibrated from the spread between loans
at the boundary between conforming and non-conforming) is high enough to re-
sult in widespread mortgage finance, but low enough to ensure that a crisis never
occurs in equilibrium, i.e. the aggregate default risk and therefore potential ag-
gregate losses remain in check even when banks ignore the default risk. Even so,
for the sake of completeness, we allow our definition of competitive equilibrium
potentially to involve a steady-state with losses exceeding λ∗.16 This necessarily
involves a higher LTV limit than in our preferred baseline. In our dynamic analysis
we rule this out, and in fact assume that should ζ for some reason be increased to
the point that a crisis and bailout occurs, the government responds by resetting ζ
back to the lower baseline level.
It should be stressed that we define government policy in terms of LTV limits
simply because in our setting that is the only variable that matters for risk. In this
15Under the quasi-linear preferences we consider below, positive foreclosure costs would mean
that virtually no risky borrowing would occur if η¯ = 0. This is not the case for more standard
convex preferences, where borrowing also serves to share risk.
16In such an equilibrium, the economy would experience a bailout every period, and the station-
ary prices would be consistent with this outcome.
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sense the LTV ratio is just a stand-in for credit risk from any source. If we had
heterogeneity in other borrower or loan characteristics that affected default rates,
policy could regulate those aspects of loans as well to mitigate excessive risk-
taking (given the subsidy and bailout assumptions). For example, if borrowers
varied in their ex ante default probabilities (as captured by FICO scores, say),
which in our model could occur if the x distribution varied across individuals,
then it would be possible for lenders to adhere to a fixed LTV requirement but still
increase risk by extending loans to a wider range of individuals. It is just for the
sake of parsimony that we limit the focus to LTV ratios, but similar results would
obtain for any characteristic that affects credit risk.
2.4 Financial Markets
We assume free entry of financial institutions with positive measure (so that they
can rely on the law of large numbers). These “banks” have constant returns
to scale and in the baseline at least are of indeterminate size. They engage in
Bertrand competition for both their rates for “depositors” and for home mortgage
borrowers. They set mortgage interest rates contract by contract, depending on
the mortgage’s LTV. These assumptions imply that expected profits are zero for
each contract; and with the law of large numbers assumption, banks make zero
profits every period. In this sense, the equilibrium implications are very similar
to those in the model by Chatterjee et al. (2007), where banks are price-taking
Walrasian actors.
Bertrand competition among finitely many banks serves an important purpose,
however, because of the role market share plays in a model of TBTF, it is in-
dispensable. As we elaborated in the previous section, the government’s bailout
policy is contingent on two macroeconomic variables: aggregate losses as a share
of GDP, and the bank’s market share. Non-atomistic profit-maximizing competi-
tors effectively internalize the impact they have on the aggregate default rate and
losses. For instance, our setup allows a bank to pick a lower interest rate than its
competitors for a risky loan, attract all consumers eligible to borrow, drive up the
equilibrium default rate and potential losses significantly, and enjoy the bailout
subsidy. In our baseline scenario this will be an off-equilibrium outcome: When
the conforming loan limit is high and any bank can drive the potential losses above
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the bailout rule, all active banks would take the same action, exhausting all such
gains from deviation. It is, however, precisely these potential off-equilibrium gains
that lead to an inevitable bailout. Observe that if banks were atomistic price tak-
ers, in principle, a “good equilibrium” could be supported despite the high LTV
limits, where mortgage interest rates remain high, risky loans are not traded, and
equilibrium losses remain low, rationalizing the high mortgage interest rates (due
to absence of a bailout).17
Since banks are bailed out only if they are TBTF, i.e. their market share exceeds
s∗, the number of active banks N during the boom period would satisfy 1/N >
s∗. The size of any single institution is indeterminate. Note that the relevant
institutions here are not the originators of mortgages; these could be any size. The
large firms are those that in equilibrium actually hold the mortgages and/or bear
the credit risk. Small institutions such as regional or local banks could originate
the mortgages but then sell them to large institutions.18
While we do not model banks’ capital structure or bank failure in any detail,
we note that the typical bank is highly levered, particularly during the era in
question. We have already discussed how highly levered the GSEs were. Large
investment banks were as well, with leverage ratios in excess of 30. Commercial
banks were not as highly levered as investment banks (though their ratios were
still in excess of 10) but many also had off-balance sheet exposures that made
their effective leverage higher than was evident from their balance sheet (see, for
example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yesiltas (2012).)
In a standard bailout, creditors are made whole, while equity holders may have
substantial losses. In the case of Bear Stearns, for example, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York facilitated a sale of the firm to J.P. Morgan by making $29
billion in loan guarantees. Bear Stearns shareholders were originally to receive
just $2 per share (the stock had traded at $93 just weeks earlier), but this was
subsequently revised to $10 per share. Bear Stearns had a leverage ratio in 2007
of 33.5, meaning that over 97% of the firm’s liabilities were covered by the bailout,
17The action space and payoffs for the dynamic Bertrand game between banks is very sophisti-
cated, and a complete specification of this game is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other
hand, the Nash equilibrium outcome is trivial due to the assumption of risk-neutrality. Motivated
by the latter, we choose to adopt a reduced-form approach focusing on the equilibrium implications
only.
18Small institutions in principle could retain the highest quality, essentially risk-free mortgages.
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and that only includes the debt.19 Since the equity holders were not wiped out,
the 97% figure is a lower bound.
Other examples of bailouts and interventions during the 2008 crisis, as well as
in previous episodes, exhibit a similar pattern: Creditors are protected essentially
100%, and equity holders are not wiped out entirely. Thus, the high leverage of
TBTF financial institutions suggests that a bailout effectively covers nearly 100%
of such institutions’ liabilities. We will use this to motivate our choice of ηˆ in our
calibration.
Assuming that interest payments are enforceable, a contract between the bank
and the household yields interest payments to the bank with certainty. For a con-
tract with LTV ratio z, the household defaults with probability G(z). We assume
that if the property is foreclosed after default, the bank loses a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1]
of the value of the house. We model this cost as dead-weight loss measured in
terms of consumption goods. It is clear that due to foreclosure costs, there are
some gains from renegotiation ex-post. The reasons lenders want to avoid fore-
closures are well-documented in the literature; Ghent and Kudylak (2011) and
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2013) discuss them in detail. First, properties de-
preciate significantly (formalized by γ in the model) when the borrowers are in
default, because the occupants have no incentive to maintain the property.20 Sec-
ond, there are legal and administrative costs. Lenders can eliminate most, if not
all, of these costs by taking alternative actions. For instance, the parties can ne-
gotiate on a short sale agreement in which borrower sells the property at a price
lower than the purchase price, remitting the proceeds to the lender, and the lender
waves the right to a deficiency. Another option is a voluntary conveyance where
the borrower hands over the deed to the property to the lender, and the lender
forgives the debt owed.21
Motivated by the empirical evidence that only a fraction of defaults results
in foreclosure, for the sake of simplicity we assume that among the defaulters,
19Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yesiltas (2012), Table 6.
20Consistent with this view, Ghent and Kudylak (2011) points out that the common view among
foreclosure attorneys is that if the lenders decide to exercise the option of foreclosure, they have a
strong interest in foreclosing quickly.
21We sidestep the question of why foreclosure ever occurs, given the alternative of a voluntary
liquidation or other arrangement that avoids the dead-weight costs of foreclosure. Presumably this
is related to strategic negotiation issues beyond the scope of this paper.
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lenders foreclose only on those who receive the moving shock. Consequently only
the share m of defaults end up in costly foreclosure. The others cause the bank to
lose the amount by which the home value falls short of the remaining mortgage
principal.
Before we formally define an equilibrium, we characterize mortgage interest
rates in equilibrium. Under our competitive assumptions, the interest rates for
contract x must satisfy the following zero-profit condition derived from the ex-
pected present value of the returns for a financial intermediary, taking the degree
of government intervention, η, and the conforming loan limit ζ into account:
ρ(z; η, ζ)z =
rz + (1− η)
∫ z
x
[z − (1−mγ)x]dG(x) z ≤ ζ
rz +
∫ z
x
[z − (1−mγ)x]dG(x) z > ζ
(5)
Note that this expression confirms our earlier claim that the mortgage interest
rate depends only on the LTV ratio z, since it is a sufficient statistic to assess
all risks in a contract from the perspective of a bank. Also note that η = 1 (a
complete guarantee) implies a risk-free borrowing rate independent of the default
probability, i.e. ρ(z; η, ζ) = r for all z ∈ [x, ζ].
We assume that G(.) is continuously differentiable everywhere in (x, x¯), and
that g(x) = G(x) = 0. Using these assumptions, it is easy to show that
1. Function ρ(z; η, ζ)z is continuously differentiable in z ∈ (x, ζ) ∪ (ζ, x¯).
2. limz↓x ρ(z; η, ζ) = r .
3. ρ′(z; η, ζ) > 0 and ρ(z¯; η, ζ) > r hold for all η ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (x, x¯).
For the rest of the exposition, unless the effect of a change in parameters is an-
alyzed explicitly, the dependence of ρ on (η, ζ) will be suppressed for notational
simplicity.
2.5 Equilibrium
To investigate the long-run effects of policy on the economy, we proceed with
defining a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for this environment.
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For what is to follow, let S = R+ × R+ × [0, 1] represent the space for total
resources I, housing h, and LTV z. We let Σ represent the Borel σ-algebra on S,
and P represent all probability measures over the measurable space (S,Σ).
Definition 1 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with government
policy {ζ¯ , η¯, s∗, λ∗, ηˆ} is a set of prices P, r, w ∈ R++, tax rate τ ∈ R+, mortgage in-
terest rates ρ : [0, 1]→ R++; policy functions ci, a′i, h′i, z′i : S → R+ for i ∈ {m, f, n};
steady-state distribution µ ∈ P; number of active banks N ≤ N¯ ; aggregate losses (as
a share of GDP) λ ∈ [0, 1]; conforming loan limit ζ ∈ [0, 1]; and subsidy η ∈ [0, 1],
such that
1. Given prices, tax rate, government policy, and ζ, policy functions solve the
households’ problem (4).
2. Given factor prices (r, w), firms maximize profits, therefore
FK(K,L) = r
FL(K,L) = w
3. Given household policy functions, intermediaries maximize profits by choosing
mortgage interest rates, i.e. they satisfy equation (5).
4. The equilibrium aggregate losses λ, number of active banks N , subsidy η, and
ζ satisfy
λ =
P
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)z
′
i(.)[ρ(z
′
i(.); η¯, ζ)− ρ(z′i(.); η, ζ]dµi
Y
(6)
N <
1
s∗
if λ ≥ λ∗
η = (1− 1[λ ≥ λ∗])η¯ + 1[λ ≥ λ∗]ηˆ
ζ = ζ¯ if λ ≥ λ∗
where 1[.] is an indicator function, taking value 1 if the condition in brackets is
true and 0 otherwise.
5. Given policy functions, prices clear all markets:
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(a) Labor market
L = 1
(b) Housing market
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)dµi = 1 (7)
(c) Capital market
K ′ =
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
(∫
a′i(.)dµi − P
∫
z′i(.)h
′
i(.)dµi
)
(8)
(d) Goods market
C +K ′ +DWL = Y + (1− δ)K
where aggregate dead-weight loss DWL equals
DWL = γmP
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)
(∫ z′i(.)
x
xdG
)
dµi
6. The government runs a balanced budget and the tax rate τ satisfies
τwL = ηP
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)
[ ∫ z′i(.)
x
[z′i(.)− (1− γm)x]dG(x)
]
dµi
7. The stationary distribution of households µ is invariant with respect to the
transition function Qi(.) i ∈ {m, f, n} induced by the policy functions.
µi(C) = pii
∑
j∈{m,f,n}
∫
Qj(s, C)dµj(s) for each C ∈ Σ
Some parts of the definition above require some clarification: First, our defi-
nition allows, for the sake of completeness, a “perpetual bailout” stationary equi-
librium in which λ ≥ λ∗ and η = ηˆ. But our baseline calibration will realisti-
cally feature a stationary equilibrium in which λ < λ∗ and η = η¯, which will
be the case for ζ¯ sufficiently low. Second, our definition of aggregate losses as
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a percentage of GDP in section 2.3 is a calculation based on a no-bailout con-
tingency, i.e. when η = η¯. For an equilibrium with no bailout (the baseline
case), η = η¯ holds, and under rational expectations, all banks make zero prof-
its by charging ρ(z′; η, ζ) = ρ(z′; η¯, ζ) for a loan with LTV z′. Therefore λ = 0
holds, as is evident in expression (6). If there is a bailout (and banks anticipate
so), they charge ρ(z′; ηˆ, ζ), and they make a loss (if there were no bailout) of
Ph′z′[ρ(z′; η¯, ζ)− ρ(z′; ηˆ, ζ)] for an agent with (h′, z′). However, when the expecta-
tions are fulfilled and a bailout occurs, these losses are completely covered by the
government. Observe that all banks actually make zero profits/losses ex post, i.e.
they are made whole after a bailout occurs in a crisis equilibrium. In this sense our
definition of equilibrium losses reflects the “pre-bailout” situation in the economy.
2.6 Equilibrium under Quasi-Linear Preferences
In this section, to obtain a sharper characterization, we assume that the instanta-
neous utility function is quasi-linear in consumption, i.e. u(c, h) = c+ v(h), where
v(h) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and satisfies limh↓0 v′(h) = ∞ and
for some h <∞, v′(h) < 1. To rule out the possibility that the non-negativity con-
straint on c is ever binding, we assume that v′(y) < 1. For our quantitative results
we will consider both this case and a limited set of results with more standard
(Cobb-Douglas) preferences, to argue that the quasi-linear specification provides
tractability without significantly affecting the main results.
Under the assumption of quasi-linearity, the choice of LTV ratio and housing is
independent of the wealth level. We make the following observations that follow
from quasi-linearity:
• Agents are effectively risk-neutral, therefore only an interest rate r that sat-
isfies β(1 + r) = 1 can be supported in equilibrium. If β(1 + r) > 1, no finite
a can satisfy the Euler equation, and if β(1 + r) < 1, a = 0 must hold, both
of which violate capital market clearing condition.
• Absent any subsidies or foreclosure costs (that is, η = γ = 0), when pre-
sented with the opportunity to borrow, agents are indifferent between choos-
ing any LTV level z ∈ [0, 1]. When a baseline subsidy of η ∈ (0, 1] for con-
forming loans z ≤ ζ is introduced, agents strictly prefer borrowing up to the
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limit ζ. By a continuity argument, this is also true when foreclosure costs γ
are positive but small.
• Since the moving and refinancing shocks are i.i.d. and preferences are quasi-
linear, all movers demand the same amount of housing h¯. In addition, since
quality shocks are i.i.d. and E(x) = 1, the expected value of the quality of
housing always equals h¯ between two consecutive moving shocks. Market
clearing for housing implies h¯ = 1 must hold, i.e. in equilibrium, every
mover demands unit housing.
• Again, thanks to the absence of selection, the home price index is indepen-
dent of the distribution of households, and in principle, only depends on
how much a representative mover is willing to pay for housing. This will be
clarified further in the home price calculation below.
In the Appendix, we show that, under the additional assumption that foreclo-
sure costs are positive but small (relative to the baseline subsidy), and imposing
the equilibrium condition β(1+r) = 1, we have the following recursive expression
that holds in equilibrium:
V˜ (h, z) = −Ph(1− z) + v(h) + βPhE(max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z)+ β(mV˜ (1, ζ) (9)
+ (1−m)fEV˜ (hx, ζ) + (1−m)(1− f)EV˜ (hx,min{ζ, (1− θ) min{1, z
x
}})
)
where V˜ (h, z) represents the value of holding housing stock h and a debt with LTV
z after housing and LTV decisions are made.22 To derive this expression, we use
the property that value function (4) is quasi-linear in total resources I, a property
inherited from the quasi-linearity of the instantaneous utility u(c, h′),
2.7 Computing the Home Price Index
Since movers solve the problem maxh′≥0,z′∈[0,1] V˜ (h′, z′) and it is optimal for them
to choose h′ = 1 and z′ = ζ, home price index P must solve ∂V˜ (h
′,z′;P )
∂h′
∣∣
(h′,z′)=(1,ζ) ≡
22Note that this is in contrast to the value function in expression (4), where value Vi(h, z) is
defined prior to the decisions on housing.
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V˜1(1, ζ;P ) = 0. Differentiating the recursive expression above, we obtain
V˜1(h, z) = −P (1− z) + v′(h) + βPE
(
max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z)
+ β
(
(1−m)fE[V˜1(hx, ζ)x] + (1−m)(1− f)E[V˜1(hx,min{ζ, (1− θ) min{1, z
x
}})x]
)
Multiply both sides by h and let W (h, z) ≡ V˜1(h, z)h to obtain
W (h, z) = −Ph(1− z) + v′(h)h+ βPhE(max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z) (10)
+ β
(
(1−m)fEW (hx, ζ) + (1−m)(1− f)EW (hx,min{ζ, (1− θ) min{1, z
x
}})
)
Observe that V1(1, ζ) = 0 if and only if W (1, ζ) = 0. This motivates our compu-
tational procedure to find the equilibrium price. We solve equation (10) using
recursive methods for W (h, z;P ) and update P until W (1, ζ;P ) = 0 is satisfied.
3 Dynamic Analysis: Impact of Relaxing the Conforming Loan
Limit
Having characterized stationary equilibrium, we now undertake a dynamic analy-
sis in which the conforming loan limits are relaxed. Before turning to the details,
we can more transparently illustrate the model’s price mechanism in a highly sim-
plified example.
3.1 Understanding the Price Effect: A Two-Period Example
There are two periods, t = 0, 1. There will be no dynamics, of course, and we
take government policy at the initial period as given (rather than triggered by
economic conditions), but the example will very cleanly show how expectations
of a bailout inflates asset prices. In particular, despite its simplicity the example
yields precisely the same pricing formula for housing as we will find below in the
fully dynamic model.
To highlight the price mechanism, we make the following assumptions:
• We dispense with capital and production, and specify an endowment econ-
omy with a linear storage technology
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• As in the full model, there are two assets:
– “Housing” h that provides direct utility, can be used to secure mortgage
debt, but has non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk x
– A fungible asset a that can be consumed as c or exchanged for h
• Preferences are also linear as well, so households are risk-neutral. Equilib-
rium prices are assumed to leave households indifferent to any non-negative
c and h that satisfy their budget constraints.
• Households are endowed at t = 0 with some (possibly heterogeneous) quan-
tity of the tradable asset a0 and one unit of housing h0.
• The yield on storing a is r = 1/β − 1; h has a terminal value h/(1− β).23
• We set default costs γ = 0.
The timing is as follows: At t = 0 households choose a1, implying an allocation
between c0 and c1, they choose h1 at price P1, and financing zP1h1. At t = 1, h1
is hit with the shock x ≥ 0, which is stochastic with E(x) = 1. Households with
negative equity default, all others repay their loans, and all choose between c1 and
h2. This implies a price per unit of housing in the second period P2 = 11−β .
We retain the essential features of the dynamic model: Households allocate
their resources a0 and P1h0 between the risk-free asset a1, consumption c0, and
housing h1. They can borrow at t = 0 using h1 as collateral. Banks take deposits
of a1 and promise a guaranteed interest rate of r, and make secured loans to
households at an interest rate that gives them an expected return of r. Households
default if and only if the value of their house falls below the principle owed on
their loan, in which case the bank takes the value of the house. Government
subsidizes a fraction η ≥ 0 of all losses due to default, sets an LTV limit of ζ, and
taxes the consumers lump-sum (T ≥ 0) to finance these subsidies.
The households’ problem is
max
{c0,c1,a1,z,h1,h2}
c0 + h1 + βE{c1 + h2/(1− β)}
23Assuming this terminal value is a convenient normalization to make our results comparable
to those of our benchmark infinite-horizon model. It represents the value of a perpetuity that
provides one unit of consumption each period.
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subject to
c1, c2, a2, h2 ≥ 0, z ∈ [0, 1]
c0 + P1h1(1− z) + a1 ≤ a0 + P1h0
c1 + P2h2 ≤ a1(1 + r)− ρ(z; η)zP1h1 + P1h1
(
max{xP2
P1
− z, 0})− T
given a0, h0 = 1. The zero-profit condition requires that interest rate ρ satisfy
ρ(z; η)z = rz + (1− η)
∫ P1
P2
z
x
(
z − P2
P1
x
)
dG(x)
The terminal value for h2 implies that P2 = 1/(1 − β). It is straightforward to
show (from the first-order condition for h1) that P1 given η and z satisfies
P1 =
1
1− β
(
1 + βη
∫ P1
P2
z
x
(P1
P2
z − x)dG(x))
With no subsidy, i.e. η = 0, P1 = 1/(1− β), the same as P2.
We can define pˆ ≡ P1
1/(1−β) = (1− β)P1 as the distortion in house prices at t = 1
due to the underpricing of risk. When η > 0, it is easy to show that agents will
borrow as much as possible up to z = ζ, and we can express pˆ as follows:24
pˆ = 1 + βη
∫ ζpˆ
x
[ζpˆ− x]dG(x)
Though pˆ appears on both sides of the equation, this expression is easy to inter-
pret: How much an agent is willing to pay for housing (P1) is inflated above the
fundamental 1/(1 − β), because only a share (1 − η) of the losses due to default
is factored into the mortgage interest payment. In other words, borrowers do not
have to fully compensate the lender for the capital loss incurred in the states of
the world in which they default (represented by the integral), because a share η
of this is loss is covered by the government.
It should be noted that pˆ is theoretically unbounded: as β, η, and ζ all approach
24We leave the verification of this claim to the readers, we prove z = ζ within the context of our
baseline model in the appendix. It is easy to show that the derivative with respect to z is always
positive, because as long as loans are subsidized, there is an incentive to borrow an extra dollar
against housing and invest it in the risk-free asset.
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one, the limiting value of pˆ is the upper bound of the support of x.
This result can be easily extended to the case in which lenders incur a loss of a
share γ of the loan principle:
pˆ = 1 + βη
∫ ζpˆ
x
[
ζpˆ− (1− η
η
γ + 1)x
]
dG(x) (11)
In this case agents will not borrow at all if η = 0, but will still borrow up to the
limit ζ if γ is sufficiently small relative to η.
We shall see that the exact same pricing equation shows up in the infinite-
horizon version of the model with quasi-linear preferences, and it holds “approx-
imately” under more general, convex preferences (in our case a Cobb-Douglas
aggregator and CRRA utility). In fact, we find that the solution pˆ for the above
equation is quantitatively indistinguishable from the ultimate price inflation we
find in any of the specifications we used in our quantitative analysis. This sug-
gests that our quantitative findings with respect to house prices are robust. Next,
we turn to the details of the dynamic analysis of our infinite horizon benchmark
model.
3.2 Infinite-Horizon Model
In our fully-dynamic model, we assume that the economy starts at its steady-state,
and an unanticipated relaxation of the conforming loan limit ζ occurs in period
zero. This can be thought of as GSEs purchasing higher-risk mortgages either
directly or indirectly, perhaps due to lax oversight, or government policies aimed
at expanding home ownership. We do not model why the limit is increased, just
as we do not model why the government is tempted to bail out large financial
institutions, but take both propensities as given. Although the increase in ζ is
treated as an ex ante zero-probability exogenous event, it can easily be generalized
to a probabilistic change in a Markov switching process. Similarly, we assume that
with the policy change resulting in a crisis, the government reverts to the baseline
policy with probability one, though this could be generalized as well.
In order to slow down the adoption of such mortgages, we assume that only
movers are able to obtain them. Although we do not have explicit transactions
costs, the idea is that since they are already obtaining financing for a new house,
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it is a natural point at which they could easily obtain a high-LTV mortgage. We
further assume that once someone has obtained a high-LTV mortgage, they con-
tinue to be able to do so when refinancing. In other words, refinancers are able to
get a new conforming mortgage at the same LTV as their original mortgage, or up
to the current conforming limit, whichever is lower.25
Assumption 3 Households become eligible for subsidized high-LTV loans when they
move, and they remain eligible until there is a change in policy.
The role this assumption plays is that even if the high conforming loan limit
presents a systemic risk, a crisis cannot occur immediately unless moving prob-
ability m is very large. Essentially, the measure of agents who are “eligible” for
loans with the new conforming loan limit builds up over time. A critical mass of
these agents must be present for any bank to trigger a bailout.
A justification for this assumption and for the inertial frictions we introduced
earlier is illustrated in figure 5. The first panel exhibits the well-known rapid
increase in outstanding mortgage debt as a share of GDP over the boom period.
Interestingly, as Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015) first pointed out,
mortgage debt as a share of market value of real estate in the second panel is very
stable over the same period. It only jumps up significantly when house prices turn
down beginning in 2006. This evidence suggests that (i) over the boom period,
increases in debt do not reflect a significant increase in loan-to-value ratios; rather
they are consequence of households borrowing more against rising home prices;
and, (ii) the debt-to-housing value ratio only goes up just prior to the crisis as
a consequence of the huge drop in home prices. We will show in the following
sections that our model predictions are consistent with this evidence due to the
frictions we introduce and the assumption we make above: The increase in home
prices will be driven by movers, a small share of households who are eligible for
high-LTV mortgages and who actively transact in the housing market, therefore
average LTV ratio in the economy does not increase by much. Instead, it will jump
up significantly over the crisis period due to the crash in home prices. In effect,
25The specifics of these frictions are for concreteness and simplicity. What is essential is only that
the opportunity to obtain a high-LTV loan spreads slowly, whether from inertia, lack of awareness,
or lack of availability.
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our “movers” act as speculators who drive up house prices for everyone, but only
until the inevitable crash.
Many features of the steady state also hold over the transition. For instance,
β(1 + r) = 1 must hold period by period. So does the property that the home
price index is determined by the movers and does not depend on the distribution
of (h, z). This implies, among other things, if agents do not anticipate any further
policy changes in the economy, home price moves to its new steady-state level
immediately in period zero. For our purposes, the more interesting case is one in
which the new conforming loan limit ζˆ is high enough to trigger a bailout some-
time in the future. In this more interesting case, because the bailout is presumed
to be followed by an enforcement of a stricter conforming loan limit ζ¯ (i.e. agents
anticipate a policy change), despite the fact that prices do not depend on distribu-
tion of households, home prices follow a non-trivial path, which must be solved
for explicitly.
To characterize prices over the transition, we use the following recursive ex-
pression Wt(h, z), which is derived from the steady-state version (10). Since only
movers price housing, Wt(h, z) represents the first-order necessary condition for
an eligible household, i.e. a household who moved in some period τ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}.
Wt(h, z) = −Pth(1− z) + v′(h)h+ βPthE
(
max{Pt+1
Pt
x− z, 0} − ρt(.; ηt+1)z
)
(12)
+ β
(
(1−m)fEWt+1(hx, ζt+1)
+ (1−m)(1− f)EWt+1(hx,min{ζt+1, (1− θ) min{1, zPt
xPt+1
}})
)
where ζt denotes the time-specific LTV limit for the conforming loans. In our par-
ticular case, if there is a bailout anticipated in some period T (which is a variable
whose value is determined as part of an equilibrium), ζt = ζˆ for 0 ≤ t < T and
ζt = ζ¯ for t ≥ T must be satisfied where ζˆ > ζ¯ denotes the elevated LTV limit
in place from the onset of the boom. Similarly, since the bailout occurs in period
T , the effective subsidy that is factored into the mortgage interest rate ρt(.) will
depend on the baseline level of guarantees ηt+1 = η¯ for t 6= T − 1, and ρT−1(.) will
depend on the elevated bailout guarantee ηT = ηˆ > η¯.
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Just as we did for the steady-state case, to solve for the prices over transition,
we use expression (12). Since prices do not depend on the distribution, the equi-
librium price drops immediately to the steady-state price for ζ = ζ¯ in the bailout
period T . Denote this steady-state price as P ss. Given Pt+1, price Pt must satisfy
the necessary condition Wt(1, ζt) = 0 since a mover in period t demands h = 1
and z = ζt. Using the fact that PT = P ss, we can solve for the prices by backward
induction.
How is the equilibrium T determined? The procedure of finding T involves
repeating the calculation above for different values of T and checking whether
there is a bank that has a profitable deviation over the given transition. To be
more precise, we say that T is an equilibrium bailout period, if no single bank
has an incentive to offer different mortgage rates over t ∈ {0, 1, 2..., T − 2}. A
potential profitable deviation would be one that involves offering lower mortgage
rates, capturing the entire mortgage market, driving the aggregate losses above
λ∗ and enjoying the subsidy (a profit, for instance if the rate is ε > 0 above the
zero-profit value). This is not a straightforward calculation because banks are
not atomistic agents and they internalize the impact of their choice of mortgage
interest rates on the home price index as well as on expectations. Hence, for each
candidate t ∈ {0, 1, 2..., T − 2}, we need to calculate a sequence of off-equilibrium
prices resulting from the deviation in which maximal potential losses (which we
call λot+1) are incurred in t+1, and check if λ
o
t+1 in fact does not exceed λ
∗ in period
t + 1 with the given sequence of off-equilibrium prices. Note that if λot+1 > λ
∗ for
some t, then the crisis would have in fact occurred in period t+ 1 < T , so we can
dismiss T as part of a bailout equilibrium.
The assumption of quasi-linear preferences simplifies this calculation signifi-
cantly. Here is a summary of the computational procedure: Fix T > 0
1. Let (P0, P1, ..., PT ) denote the sequence of equilibrium prices with the expec-
tation of a bailout in period T . Calculate them using (12) as explained above
in detail. Then, for each t ∈ {0, 1, 2..., T − 2},
2. Consider the case in which a bank unilaterally offers mortgages at rate
ρt(.; ηˆ), the competitive rate that would prevail if there is a bailout next
period, while all other banks are driven out of the competition. This choice
maximizes aggregate losses, rationalizing the intent of the deviation, while
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still retaining the possibility of breaking even ex post if the government were
to bail it out.
3. This deviation will naturally lead to an off-equilibrium price sequence, which
we denote Pot ≡ (P ot , P ot+1...). If there is a bailout next period due to this
deviation, P ot+j = P
ss for all j ≥ 1 thanks to quasi-linearity, and due to our
assumption that tight limits are reinstated forever after a bailout. Hence, this
deviation would have a non-trivial impact only on P ot , and this price can be
computed in a straightforward manner using expression (12). In fact, under
quasi-linearity, it can be shown that P ot = PT−1, the equilibrium home price
index right before the presumed crisis date.26
4. Given Pt = P ot and Pt+1 = P
ss and the distribution µt, aggregate losses/GDP
ratio for the following period, λot+1 can be calculated in a straightforward
manner using its definition.
5. Check if λot+1 < λ
∗. If this condition holds, the bank would not find it prof-
itable to deviate in period t, because the highest aggregate losses a deviation
can achieve does not exceed the threshold to trigger a bailout.
If the final condition is satisfied for all t over the transition, we verify that T is an
equilibrium bailout period.
3.3 Calibration
To calibrate the friction parameters m and f , we rely on statistics from before the
boom. Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) find that approximately 50 percent of
mortgages are repaid (either because of moving or refinancing) within 10 years.
Venti and Wise (1989) find that approximately four percent of homeowners move
each year. These facts suggest values of m = 0.04 and f = 0.033. Of course in
reality these hazards, especially the prepayment rates, are not constant or inde-
pendent of duration, but for our purposes, the assumption of constant hazard rates
is tractable and seems relatively innocuous. For robustness we also computed the
26This algorithm is difficult to implement under more general preferences, because the home
price index is a non-trivial function of distribution of households. This greatly complicates the
computation of off-equilibrium price sequences.
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solution to the model for the case m = 1, i.e. with no moving friction. While
of course there were difference in some dimensions, the price response was very
similar (and under quasi-linearity, identical) to what we find with m = 0.04.
We set θ, the rate at which non-refinanced mortgages must be paid down each
year, at 0.033, to reflect the typical repayment of principal for a 30-year mortgage.
Of course this rate is not constant for a self-amortizing mortgage, but again the
assumption of a constant rate is made for tractability’s sake.
For its flexibility, we use a Kumaraswamy distribution for the idiosyncratic
shock x. This distribution has 4 parameters: The lower bound x, upper bound
x¯, and two shape parameters a, b > 0), making it effectively as flexible as the Beta
distribution, but with the advantage of having a closed-form density and c.d.f. In
its standard form the c.d.f. Gˆ and density gˆ are
Gˆ (x) = 1− (1− xa)b
gˆ (x) = abxa−1 (1− xa)b−1
for x ∈ [0, 1]. For our purposes we will consider the generalized distribution with
a change of variables so that the support of the distribution is [x, x¯], where 0 ≤x<
x¯ <∞.27
For the baseline calibration, we fix x¯ = 1.4 and choose the shape parameters
(a, b, x) jointly to target E(x) = 1, the standard deviation σx and the equilibrium
annual default probability. The literature provides conflicting annual volatility
estimates based on different data sets. OFHEO reported annualized volatility es-
timates quarterly for each state separately between 1996-2000. These estimates
ranged from 0.08 to 0.12. We think that these estimates should be taken as a con-
servative lower bound since aggregate volatility should be higher than regional
volatilities. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimate an annual volatility of around
0.15 based on data at the national level, and based on the lack of correlation with
27This makes the distribution and density functions
G (x) = 1−
(
1−
(
x− x
∆
)a)b
g (x) =
ab
∆
(
x− x
∆
)a−1(
1−
(
x− x
∆
)a)b−1
where ∆ ≡ x¯− x.
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returns on T-Bills, Stocks, and Bonds, argue that this volatility is almost entirely
associated with idiosyncratic risk. This value is also consistent with the estimates
reported by Case and Shiller (1989).28 Based on this evidence, we target an an-
nual volatility of σx = 0.15. While our calibration cannot of course pin down all
of the parameters of the distribution, we choose the parameters values a = 1.329,
b = 2.232, x = 0.743 jointly to match E(x) = 1, σx = 0.15 and a baseline steady
state default rate of d = 0.02. The latter is based on data from the Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA), which reports quarterly FHA foreclosure starts as a
percentage of outstanding insured loans. This rate was fairly stable around 2%
between 1990 and 2000.29 Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013) also use 2 percent
as their baseline default rate.
As mentioned earlier, researchers have found that the foreclosure “discount”
is about 22 percent. In our model much of this would be explained by selection,
meaning that foreclosed houses are those that have had adverse x shocks. We
instead base our choice of γ on studies of the direct costs of foreclosures, excluding
those that amount to pure transfers such as the inability of the lender to collect
mortgage payments during the process. For example, Cutts and Merrill (2008)
document costs that suggest these dead-weight losses in the vicinity of 3 to 5
percent of the home’s value, so we set γ = 0.03. The model’s predictions are not
sensitive to this choice.
For preferences, in the quasi-linear case with u = c + v(h) we assume v(h) =
ν h
1−µ
1−µ with µ = 2 (though the results are not at all sensitive to this parameter).
With Cobb-Douglas utility we have u(c, h) = c1−ψhψ. Expenditure share parame-
ters ν = 0.18 and ψ = 0.18 are chosen to match average expenditure shares on
housing from NIPA tables between 1959 and 2015, which is approximately 18%
in the post-war era.30
The choice of a value for λ∗ presents a challenge, as the concept of “potential
losses” makes it intrinsically difficult to measure, given that actions by the govern-
28Quoting Case and Shiller (1989), “Individual housing prices are like many individual corporate
stock prices in the large standard deviation of annual percentage change, close to 15 percent a year
for individual housing prices.”
29For details, see the report by Pinto (2011) who compiled these data from MBA sources. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac reported somewhat lower delinquency rates prior to 2005.
30The value of ν equals 0.18 just by coincidence, we set its value so that in equilibrium, housing
expenditure share P ssr/(P ssr+Css) equals its counterpart from data. Note that for the transacting
agents h = 1 and the implicit rents equal P ssr.
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ment taken to avoid such losses imply that they may never occur. Moreover, given
the contagious nature of financial crises, losses may multiply into different asset
classes. Also, however it is measured, it must be an upper bound, since we only
know what has been observed to trigger a bailout; the actual trigger point could be
lower. In any case, there have been numerous attempts to quantify this “impulse”
that hit the financial system. As a starting point we rely on the discussion in the
report by Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) that suggests numbers in the
vicinity of $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion (p. 228): $80 billion from the GSE’s mortgage-
backed securities, “as much as $170 billion” in other mortgage assets held by banks
and the GSEs, $500 billion from (presumably private-label) mortgage-backed se-
curities and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and “another $655 billion in
write-downs on commercial mortgage-backed securities, CLOs, leveraged loans,
and other loans and securities....” Accordingly we set λ∗ = 0.08 as a share of GDP.
Finally, there is the choice of η¯, the baseline subsidy, and ηˆ, the bailout pa-
rameter. A rough upper bound on this baseline η can be seen from the difference
between mortgage rates on conforming and non-conforming loans, the latter be-
ing ineligible for purchase and securitization by the GSEs. Passmore, Sherlund,
and Burgess (2005) find a differential of seven basis points between conforming
and non-conforming mortgages, after controlling for other risk factors, and 4.5
basis points for loans not exceeding 80 percent LTV. In our model, this implies a
baseline η¯ of 0.15. Table 1 summarizes the calibration. This turns out to be large
enough to offset the disincentive to borrow due to foreclosure costs, so that agents
choose to borrow up to the limit.
As for ηˆ, the earlier discussion of bailouts for highly levered financial institu-
tions suggests a number very close to one. With this in mind we set ηˆ = 0.99,
which would suffice to bail out debt-holders and not completely wipe out equity
holders.
3.4 Results with No Frictions (m = 1)
To understand the magnitude of the price effects, it is illuminating to look at the
case where everyone moves every period. It turns out that in this special case, the
steady-state price as well as price inflation can be expressed in a relatively simple
form.
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Assume further that before the increase in the conforming loan limit, ζ = ζ¯.
Using expression (10), W (1, ζ¯) = 0, and letting m = 1, we obtain the following
expression for the steady-state price
P ss(ζ¯) =
v′(1)
(1− ζ¯)− βE(max{x− ζ¯ , 0} − ρ(ζ¯; η¯)ζ¯) (13)
It is easy to verify that in the limiting case of η¯ = γ = 0 this price simply equals
v′(1)/(1− β).
Suppose as part of an equilibrium, a bailout occurs in period T after the LTV
limits relax to some ζ¯ in period zero. Next we ask the following question: How
much does the price go up right before the bailout? Since price reverts back
immediately to P ss(ζ¯) in period T , we can use expression (12) to compute PT−1.
More specifically we have
PT−1 =
v′(1)
(1− ζˆ)− βE(max{ P ss
PT−1
x− ζˆ , 0} − ρ(PT−1
P ss
ζˆ; ηˆ)ζˆ
)
This expression reflects the fact that a bailout occurs in period T where the effec-
tive subsidy equals η∗. Let pˆ = PT−1
P ss
represent the price “inflation” due to bailout.
Dividing the two expressions above yields an implicit expression in pˆ.
pˆ =
(1− ζ¯)− βE(max{x− ζ¯ , 0} − ρ(ζ¯; ηˆ)ζ¯)
(1− ζˆ)− βE(max{1
pˆ
x− ζˆ , 0} − ρ(pˆζˆ; ηˆ)ζˆ)
This expression becomes even simpler if we assume either η¯ = 0, or that ζ¯ ≤ x.
Either of these assumptions results in a baseline with a zero default rate. This is
a useful benchmark because our baseline calibration features a very low default
rate (in line with the data from pre-boom era), and consequently results in a
quantitatively very similar steady state. Under these assumptions, and imposing
the zero-profit condition (5) for ρ(.), we can show that P ss(x) = v
′(1)
1−β , and house
price inflation in the bailout state with η = ηˆ satisfies
pˆ = 1 + βη
∫ ζˆpˆ
x
[
ζˆ pˆ− (1− ηˆ
ηˆ
γ + 1
)
x
]
dG
Note that this pricing equation is identical to the pricing equation (11) we found in
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our two period example. Clearly, in equilibrium, the default rate (and foreclosure
rate) in the crisis equals d = G(ζˆ pˆ). Note that for this to be an equilibrium,
equilibrium losses λ must exceed the threshold value λ∗ that warrants a bailout—
otherwise η would remain at the baseline η¯. It can be shown that
λ =
v′(1)
1− β
(ηˆ − η¯) ∫ ζˆpˆ
x
[
ζˆ pˆ− (1− γ)x]dG
Y
Observe that when m = 1, either a bailout occurs in period T = 1, one period
after the LTV limit is relaxed, or it never does, depending on the level of ζˆ. The
reason is that the price effect characterized above is independent of time. If, the
time-independent condition λ ≥ λ∗ is satisfied, firms move in period 0, offer loans
at a highly subsidized rate (reflecting the expectation of the bailout), drive the
aggregate losses above λ∗ (since every consumer can move) and trigger a bailout,
consistent with the initial expectations. On the other hand if λ < λ∗, no bank (or
group of banks) can gain by offering highly subsidized (η = ηˆ) mortgage interest
rates because they cannot drive the default rate above the threshold rule. In this
less interesting case, the steady-state price moves up permanently in period 0 to
the level P ss(ζˆ) and stays there forever.
With no frictions it is feasible also to consider more realistic preferences. Figure
6 depicts the steady state distributions of housing and LTV in the case with Cobb-
Douglas preferences. In this case the convexity of preferences gives rise to a wide
distribution of both variables in the population. This is because the idiosyncratic
shocks to housing value act as permanent wealth shocks, so that each household’s
c and h respond to its history of x shocks. (By contrast, in the quasi-linear case, h
is essentially independent of the shocks and only varies because of frictions.)
Figure 7 depicts the response of the housing price P , the default rate, and LTV
to a relaxation of the LTV limit from 0.8 to 0.99. Because there are no inertial
frictions, everything happens at once: P jumps by about 17 percent, average LTV
jumps from about 0.4 up to 0.99, and the default rate jumps from the low baseline
of about 2 percent up to over 80 percent.
Before adding frictions, we can compare no-frictions results with Cobb-Douglas
and quasi-linear preferences. The point of this is to show that the magnitude of
the price response is similar in both cases, so that when we add frictions and focus
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only on the quasi-linear case for tractability, we have some confidence that quasi-
linearity is not playing a crucial role. Figure 8 compares the price response in
the two cases. We see that the response is similar in magnitude, but in the Cobb-
Douglas case the price response exhibits greater volatility, rising higher than under
quasi-linear preferences, and then falling below the steady state level during the
crisis before recovering. Thus if anything our reliance on quasi-linear preferences
in the next section may understate the price impact.
3.5 Results with Frictions
We now add inertial frictions to the model, so that our calibrated quantitative
analysis will yield more realistic dynamics. They are associated with moving or
refinancing, and have the effect of prolonging the boom over many periods, and
thus postponing the crisis/bailout after conforming loan limits are relaxed.
The upper panel of Figure 9 depicts the steady state distribution of housing
in the model with quasi-linear preferences and inertial frictions. (Note that the
model does not determine a particular distribution of c and a.) The spike at h = 1
represents the choices of movers, while the rest of the distribution results from
the fact that at any point in time 1 − m of households do not move, and their
effective housing evolves over time from the x shocks. The lower panel displays
the distribution of LTV. Again the spike at 0.8 reflects the common choice of both
movers and refinancers to borrow up to the conforming loan limit because of the
modest subsidy. The rest of the distribution is the consequence of the friction that
only 1−m− f of the population can reset their borrowing.
Figure 10 illustrates the dynamic response of the economy for the benchmark
calibration. It is worth repeating that in this model the LTV ratio proxies for all risk
characteristics, so an increase in the conforming limit is a metaphor for any kind of
relaxation of lending standards. We see that the frictions yield a sustained boom
period because of the slow adjustment of borrowing behavior. The lower right
panel shows that overall average LTV rises only modestly, from approximately
0.55 up to 0.58. This is consistent with the evidence in figure 5 described earlier:
While there were many new mortgages that were very risky (whether in terms
of LTV, FICO scores, or other characteristics), the aggregate ratio did not change
dramatically, as increased borrowing was largely accompanied for most of this
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period by price appreciation. Upper left panels depict the potential losses/GDP
explained in our dynamic analysis section, i.e. the maximum losses that a bank
would have incurred had it taken over the whole market by offering risk-free
mortgage rates. This variable goes up over time as more and more household
become eligible for high LTV loans, and ultimately transcends the critical loss
threshold λ∗ = 0.08, at which point a crisis/bailout occurs.
Figures 11, and 12 depict alternative equilibria with λ∗ = 0.07 and λ∗ = 0.09
respectively. Clearly, the price impact of the relaxation of the LTV limit is the same
for all three cases, and the only difference is the timing of the crisis in equilibrium.
In the benchmark calibration, a crash occurs in period T ∗ = 12, and for the other
two cases, it occurs in periods T ∗ = 7 and T ∗ = 21 respectively.
Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16 depict the dynamic response of various economic
variables of interest to a relaxation of borrowing standards (an increase in the con-
forming limit from 0.8 to 1) at t = 0 under the baseline parameters and various
alternatives: Lower η¯ (0.05 instead of 0.15); lower ηˆ (0.95 versus 0.99); higher θ
(0.05 versus 0.033); and lower σ (0.12 versus 0.15). Obviously, given the bench-
mark threshold value of λ∗, these parameter changes also affect the equilibrium
T ∗. To facilitate an accurate comparison of variables with the benchmark econ-
omy, for all these cases, we adjust λ∗ so that a crisis occurs in period T ∗ = 12
like in the benchmark case. It should be noted that in the absence of any inertial
frictions (that is, m = f = 1), the impact of this relaxation of credit standards
would be an immediate jump in the house price of exactly the peak jump (about
18 percent) in the case with frictions, which would then immediately precipitate
a crisis.
Of course the primary interest is in the price effect, shown in the upper left
panel. The initial impact on price is modest, as the crisis is years away, and only
a small fraction of borrowers takes advantage of the relaxed credit environment.
They pay more for housing primarily because of the larger effective subsidy im-
plied by higher LTV loans, even if η¯ is unchanged for the time being. As this
process continues, however, the price increases accelerate and the accumulating
leverage and default risk drive the economy towards a crisis in which aggregate
losses pass the threshold that induces a bailout.
The ultimate price effect of approximately 18 percent is very robust to a variety
of parameter assumptions. For example, the price jumps by approximately the
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same 18 percent in the frictionless case (m = 1), the only difference being that
the jump occurs immediately upon the change in lending standards, and the crisis
occurs one period later.31
While the welfare impact is not our primary focus, in the model the cost of the
crisis is limited to the increase in foreclosure costs. While these can be substan-
tial, the assumption of a fixed housing stock limits other channels of impact. As
mentioned above, we also do not model any benefits from increased home own-
ership or increased liquidity from relaxation of credit constraints. Of course such
“benefits” from the crisis would be transitory.
We have argued that the crisis outcome requires both a relaxed LTV limit and
the implicit inability to let large financial institutions fail. It is clear from our
earlier analysis that tight credit limits keep losses from exceeding the threshold
that trigger bailouts. We also need to show that relaxed credit limits would not,
in the absence of bailout expectations, result in inflated house prices. In terms
of our policy parameters, this is equivalent to assuming that λ∗ = 1—that is, the
threshold for losses that trigger bailouts is so high that they never occur.
We carry out this exercise both in the quasi-linear model and the Cobb-Douglas
specification. In the quasi-linear case, relaxing the LTV limit leads to a one-time
permanent jump in in home price index of only about 4.5%. In magnitude this is
equal to the initial jump in home prices in period-0 for the benchmark calibration
under the bailout equilibrium in figure 10, and is much smaller than the overall
price increase over the boom. The initial jump in the benchmark dynamics is al-
most entirely driven by the movers who borrow up to the now-higher borrowing
limit and implicitly enjoy the baseline subsidy η¯. As explained earlier, the bailout
(and therefore the bailout subsidy) is too far ahead in the future to have much
impact on the movers’ pricing of the asset in period 0 due to discounting. In our
counterfactual exercise, the price goes up precisely due to the same effect. The
price increase is permanent in the counterfactual, because there is no expectation
of a bailout and a policy change, and it is constant due to quasi-linearity. Financial
institutions suffer no losses, i.e. λt = 0 for all periods t, because mortgages are
priced based on the actual default risk involved, net of the small benchmark sub-
31In our discussion we speak of prices, but the results apply to price/rent ratios as well, since in
the model rents are essentially constant–precisely constant in the quasi-linear case, and changing
very little with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
40
sidy. The burden to the taxpayers of the baseline subsidy is less than 1% of labor
income in the new steady-state distribution with higher LTV limit, even though all
movers and re-financers borrow up to the high LTV limit.
In the Cobb-Douglas specification, the price impact of increasing the LTV limit
with no bailout prospects is actually negative, though the difference is too small
to be of any economic significance (less than 0.1%). The reason prices are not
bid up in the Cobb-Douglas specification in this counterfactual is the convexity
of preferences. Because the baseline subsidy is small, high-LTV mortgages are
only attractive to wealth-poor agents. These agents do not make much of an
impact on overall demand. As a consequence, the overall price effect is negative
because of now-higher dead-weight losses associated with the higher incidence of
default. Since these losses are paid in terms of consumption goods, the price of
consumption is bid up relative to housing, and this leads to a lower housing price.
The impact of the higher LTV limit on the tax burden is even smaller than in the
quasi-linear case.
This confirms the model’s implication that if the government could have pre-
committed not to bail out large financial institutions, the price impact of introduc-
ing high-LTV loans would have been small and possibly negative. The banks would
have mostly (except for the modest baseline subsidy) internalized the higher de-
fault costs and made no losses in expectation, and the tax burden resulting from
the subsidy would have been small, despite an increase in the incidence of de-
faults.
Finally, while we do not explicitly model a rental market, we can say something
about the implicit rental price for homes. It is apparent that with quasi-linear pref-
erences, the rental price will be constant at v′(1). Any variations in P are entirely
due to changes in expectations regarding the net subsidy η given foreclosure costs,
which gets capitalized into the asset price. Consequently our findings regarding
house prices also characterize the behavior of price/rent ratios.32
32With more general preferences the implicit rental price is not so clearly defined as in the quasi-
linear case, because of heterogeneity in the marginal rate of substitution arising from incomplete
markets. Even so, it should be clear that the distortions we describe below affect only house prices
and not rents by any reasonable definition. The implicit subsidy of Too Big to Fail is clearly one
related to ownership, not renting.
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4 Conclusion
It is widely believed that a relaxation of lending standards, through a rapid expan-
sion of the subprime market and availability of high-LTV loans, was the dominant
force that paved the way to the financial crisis of 2008. Many observers also cite
“Too Big to Fail” (i.e. the government’s unwillingness to allow large financial insti-
tutions to fail or incur enormous losses) as a factor in those institutions’ increasing
leverage—both their own and those of their clients. The main contribution of this
paper is to directly link these phenomena both to each other and to a quantita-
tively large endogenous boom and bust in house prices and price/rent ratios. That
is, credit limits in our model are not arbitrary frictions, but a welfare-improving
response to the inability of government to allow large financial institutions to fail,
and their relaxation has major adverse consequences. This contrasts with many
models in the literature in which credit limits are imposed or removed arbitrarily
and are actually welfare-reducing when in place.
At a normative level, our counterfactual exercise suggests that it is the com-
bination of the government’s unwillingness to let large financial institutions fail
together with lax regulation (or underestimation) of portfolio risk that produce
the potential for a crisis. Either of these alone results in modest damage. Absent
expectation of bailouts, lax regulation of mortgage risk results in higher default
rates, but because much of the cost is internalized, there is negligible spillover into
asset prices. At the same time, our baseline case shows that adequate regulation
of risk-taking prevents the expectation of bailouts from distorting asset prices.
Taking the model more literally, an alternative to the direct supervision of risk
would be a market share limitation on financial institutions, including GSE’s such
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The high-default “bad equilibrium” involves firms
becoming large by undermining credit standards, thereby generating a sort of
“race to the bottom” in credit quality. Size limitations could lead those institu-
tions to plausibly expect a response to aggregate adverse outcomes more like that
seen during the Savings & Loan crisis, when hundreds of small institutions were
allowed to fail, thereby reducing the risk-taking that would lead to such an out-
come. In addition, recent work by Neuberg et al. (2016) suggests that it may be
possible to reduce market expectations of bailouts by offering instead the prospect
of “bail-ins,” in which governments intervene but impose losses on creditors.
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In short, if the government cannot help but protect too-big-to-fail lenders in
the event of a crisis, it is essential that this policy be coupled either with strict
controls on leverage and other sources of credit risk, or with a mechanism that in-
duces proper pricing of risk, at least for those large firms. With such mechanisms
in place, the equilibrium that results in a crisis and subsequent bailout is elimi-
nated. Alternatively, a government that is unable or unwilling to restrict high-risk
activities by large institutions, should either find a way to bind itself not to bail
out failing institutions, or, alternatively, limit the size of institutions in terms of
market share.
Our main technical contribution is to illustrate that a model with homogeneous
and rational beliefs can generate asset price movements that appear to deviate
substantially from fundamentals over a number of periods. These deviations are
not “bubbles” in the standard sense of that term. House prices are distorted by an
implicit subsidy that we presume to be unsustainable, and hence responsible for a
boom-bust cycle. These findings provide an alternative (not necessarily mutually
exclusive) to the view that beliefs were irrational or otherwise non-standard and
heterogeneous. Although some aspects of the model may appear too simplified
to warrant quantitative conclusions, we argue that those conclusions are robust,
depending to a great extent only on the cross-sectional distribution of house price
changes, and very little on the details of preferences or default behavior. Trading
frictions were shown to affect the timing but not the magnitude of our results on
house prices and defaults.
We also find that a boom in house prices can be detrimental to welfare. Since
housing is used as collateral for borrowing, an increase in its price would effec-
tively act to loosen credit constraints in the economy. However, we show that
when these price increases are driven by the policy and market failures depicted
in our model, the distorting effects are potentially large and costly. This prediction
contrasts with some of the literature that suggests, either directly or indirectly, that
there could be “welfare-improving booms” in the real-estate market.
While our analysis captures many characteristics of the mortgage and housing
markets which we believe played an important role in the crisis, we have ab-
stracted from some potentially important aspects of the market. We have demon-
strated the robustness of our key findings, but there are several extensions that
would add realism to the model and enable it to replicate a broader set of facts.
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First, aggregate shocks (aside from the policy shock) would yield a more realistic
boom and bust, insofar as a persistent favorable shock that results in aggregate
growth might help prolong a boom and create realistic uncertainty about the tim-
ing of a collapse. The bust and crisis could be triggered by an adverse aggregate
shock, thus having uncertain timing, in contrast to the perfect foresight in our
model. Uncertainty with regard to government behavior, such as the threshold
for bailouts, would have a similar impact. Second, we do not allow for home
construction. A persistent boom, such as we find with inertial frictions, could
stimulate new home construction, which might temper the rise in house prices.
On the other hand, the resulting overhang at the time of the crash would result
in a bigger decline in prices, and likely increase the welfare costs of the policy
change.33 Finally, we think it is feasible add demographics (for example with
an overlapping generations framework), and to add an explicit rental market, so
agents can choose between owning and renting. Extensions along these lines will
make the model more realistic without significantly altering the main results.
33We estimate that the U.S. housing stock was only about 1.5 percent above trend at the peak of
the boom in 2007. This contrasts with Spain, for example, where according to Bardhan, Edelstein,
and Kroll (2012), between 2000-2009, 5 million new homes were built, relative to a stock of 20
million, during the same time period.
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Table 1: Parameter Values-Baseline Calibration
Variable Baseline Value Value in Boom/Target
Policy Variables
Loan-to-Value Limit (ζ) 0.800 1.000
Subsidy/Bailout Rate (η) 0.150 0.990
Threshold Agg. Losses/GDP (λ∗) 0.080
Fixed Parameters
Discount Rate (β) 0.960 r = 0.04
Default Cost (γ) 0.030 Foreclosure costs 3%
Mortgage Paydown Rate (θ) 0.033 Average on 30-year mortgage
Shock Distribution Parameter (a) 1.329 2% default rate
Shock Distribution Parameter (b) 2.232 E(x) = 1
Shock Distribution Parameter (x) 0.743 σx = 0.15
Shock Distribution Parameter (x¯) 1.400
Moving Hazard (m) 0.040 4% annual homeowner moving rate
Refinancing Hazard (f) 0.033 50% ten-year prepayment rate
Housing Share for Quasi-Linear (ν) 0.181 Average expenditure share (NIPA)
Housing Share for Cobb-Douglas (ψ) 0.180 Average expenditure share (NIPA)
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Figure 1: Real House Price Index
Note.– Ratio of FHFA House Price Index (All Transactions) to the CPI (All Urban): All less Shelter.
Left Panel-Log Scale (1998Q4=0). Right panel-Levels relative to trend (1998Q4=1).
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Figure 2: House Price/Rent Index.
Note.– Ratio of FHFA House Price Index (All Transactions) to the CPI (All Urban): Rent of Primary
Residence. (1998Q4=1)
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Figure 3: Fannie Mae High-LTV Mortgage Purchases
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development
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Figure 4: GSE Investments in Private Label Securitizations
Source: OFHEO, Report to Congress, 2008
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Figure 5: Comparison of Outstanding Mortgage Debt-to-GDP ratio and Outstand-
ing Mortgage Debt-to-Real Estate Value
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) and Flow of Funds
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Figure 6: Stationary Distribution: Frictionless with Cobb-Douglas Utility
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Figure 7: Dynamic Response: Frictionless with Cobb-Douglas Utility
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Figure 8: Price Responses: Cobb-Douglas vs. Quasi-linear Utility
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Figure 9: Steady State Distributions with Frictions in the Quasi-Linear Case
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Figure 10: Dynamic Response: Baseline with Quasi-linear Utility
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Figure 11: Dynamic Response: Equilibrium with λ∗ = 0.07
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Figure 12: Dynamic Response: Equilibrium with λ∗ = 0.09
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Figure 13: Dynamic Response: η¯ = 0.05 vs. Baseline η¯ = 0.15 (dotted)
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Figure 14: Dynamic Response: ηˆ = 0.95 vs. Baseline ηˆ = 1 (dotted)
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Figure 15: Dynamic Response: θ = 0.05 vs. Baseline θ = 0.033 (dotted)
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Figure 16: Dynamic Response: σ = 0.12 vs. Baseline σ = 0.15 (dotted)
56
Appendices
A Technical Results on Quasi-Linear Case
For all results that follow, assume that utility function takes the form u(ct, ht+1) =
ct+v(ht+1) where function v(.) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, differentiable,
and satisfies limh↓0 v′(h) =∞.
A.1 Choice of LTV for borrowers
Consider an agent of type i ∈ {m, f}, maximizing objective function (1) subject to
the set of constraints (3). In this section, we demonstrate that this agent borrows
up to the conforming loan limit when subsidy η is sufficiently large compared to
the foreclosure cost γ. For the choice of z ∈ [0, 1], the derivative of the objective
function with respect to zt+1 equals
Pht+1 + βPht+1
∂
∂zt+1
(
E(max{0, xt+1 − zt+1})− ρ(zt+1; η, ζ)zt+1
)
Using expression (5) for ρ(.), differentiating the second expression, and simplify-
ing, we obtain
Pht+1
(
1 + β(−(1 + r)− γmzt+1g(zt+1)(1− η) + ηG(zt+1))
)
zt+1 ≤ ζ
Pht+1
(
1 + β(−(1 + r)− γmzt+1g(zt+1)
)
zt+1 > ζ
Imposing the equilibrium condition β(1 + r) = 1, this simplifies further:Pht+1
(
ηG(zt+1)− (1− η)γmzt+1g(zt+1)
)
zt+1 ≤ ζ
−Pht+1γmzt+1g(zt+1) zt+1 > ζ
Under our assumptions on the pdf and cdf functions g(x) and G(x), we can
make the following observations:
1. When γ = η = 0, the derivative expressions are identically zero over all
choices of zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, in this case, agent is indifferent between any
choice of LTV.
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2. When γ > 0 and η = 0, these expressions are negative for all zt+1 ∈ (x, 1].
We conclude that in this case, agent does not engage in risky borrowing, and
we can assume without loss of generality, that zt+1 = x.
3. When γ = 0 and η > 0, increasing zt+1 beyond x up to and including ζ
improves the objective, as the derivative is strictly positive. The discontinuity
of the derivative at zt+1 = ζ does not alter the analysis, since the derivative
is negative only for z > ζ. In this case, agent optimally borrows up to the
conforming loan limit, i.e. zt+1 = ζ.
Thus the borrowing decision takes extreme values (corner solutions) that de-
pend on the relative magnitudes of η and γ. Since these functions are continuous
in both of these parameters, these observations suggest that item 3 would still hold
true when η is “large” and γ is “small”. In our numerical analysis, for all cases we
cover, we also verify these results numerically.
A.2 Irrelevance of risk-free assets and labor income for housing and LTV
decisions
In this section, we illustrate that with quasi-linear preferences we can safely ignore
the choice of at+1 and after-tax earnings w¯ for the sake of analyzing housing and
LTV decisions. More specifically, under the equilibrium interest rate that satisfies
β(1 + r) = 1 and quasi-linearity, the objective can be written in such a way that
does not involve the choice of these variables.
Using the constraint (3) to eliminate ct from the objective (1), we obtain the
following equivalent sequential problem
max
ht+1,zt+1,at+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
It − Pht+1(1− zt+1)− at+1 + v(ht+1)
)
subject to
It+1 ≡ It+1(ht+1, zt+1, xt+1, at+1)
= w¯ + at+1(1 + r) + Pht+1
(
max{0, xt+1 − zt+1} − ρ(zt+1)zt+1
)
for all t ≥ 0
ct, ht+1, at+1 ≥ 0, and zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]
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ht+1 = htxt for types {f, n}
zt+1 ≤ (1− θ) min{1, zt
xt
} for type n
given I0 > 0, h0 > 0, z0 ≥ 0, x0 ∈ [x, x¯].
Under the assumption that the non-negativity constraints on ct and at+1 never
bind34, we observe that
1. The present value of labor earnings w¯ > 0 enters additively, and therefore
can be omitted without affecting the optimal policies.
2. Since β(1 + r) = 1, all terms involving at+1 for all t ≥ 0 cancel out from the
objective.
3. The expected value EtIt+1 = Pht+1E
(
max{0, xt+1− zt+1}−ρ(zt+1)zt+1
)
, con-
ditional on having chosen (ht+1, zt+1), is independent of the type realization
in t+ 1, where the expectation is taken over xt+1.
Using these results and moving terms across time periods, the objective func-
tion can be simplified further,
max
ht+1,zt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
−Pht+1(1−zt+1)+v(ht+1)+βPht+1
(
max{0, xt+1−zt+1}−ρ(zt+1)zt+1
))
subject to
ct, ht+1 ≥ 0, and zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]
ht+1 = htxt for types {f, n}
zt+1 ≤ (1− θ) min{1, zt
xt
} for type n
given h0 > 0, z0 ≥ 0, x0 ∈ [x, x¯].
A.3 Derivation of the Bellman Equation
A rigorous proof of equivalence of recursive and sequential representation of this
problem is beyond the scope of this paper. However, with standard arguments,
34We conjecture that the non-negativity constraints will not bind provided w¯ is sufficiently large,
and in practice do not observe any cases where they do bind in our simulations.
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one can show that if a solution to the sequential problem in the previous section
exists, than it must satisfy the following recursive version
V˜ (h, z) = −Ph(1− z) + v(h) + βPhE(max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z)+ β(mE( max
(h′,z′)∈Γm
V˜ (h′, z′))
+ (1−m)fE(max
z′∈Γf
V˜ (hx, z′)) + (1−m)(1− f)E( max
z′∈Γn(z,x)
V˜ (hx, z′))
)
where Γm ≡ {(h′, z′)|h′ > 0, z′ ∈ [0, 1]} denotes the choice set for a mover, Γf ≡
{z′|z′ ∈ [0, 1]} denotes the choice set for a refinancer, and Γn(x, z) ≡ {z′|z′ ∈
[0, (1 − θ) min{1, z
x
}]} denotes the choice set for other agents. Function V˜ (h, z)
represents the value of the household after shock x is realized, and after default,
as well as (h, z) decisions have been made.
In the first part of this appendix, we have shown that a mover and a refinancer
always borrow up to the conforming loan limit. Moreover, at an equilibrium,
every mover demands h = 1. Now consider a type n agent: When presented with
a choice of LTV limit in z′ ∈ [0, (1 − θ) min{1, z
x
}], this agent would opt for an
LTV limit as high as possible, up to the conforming loan limit for the same reason
as the other types of agents. Hence the choice would satisfy z′ = min{ζ, (1 −
θ) min{1, z
x
}}. Putting all these pieces together, we obtain the value function in
expression (9).
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